Kimi: Hey, Socrates! It’s nice to see you again. Today, we’ll be looking at your three parts of the soul: the spirit, the rational calculation, and the appetites. After we’ve restated what you said, we’re going to probe you with questions regarding the three parts. Is that alright?

Socrates: Sure, sounds good.

Kimi: All right, so we’re looking at a certain part of Book IV of the Republic, sections 437b to 441e. In these sections, you describe the three parts of the soul: the appetites, the spirit, and the rational calculation. You say that the three parts of the soul parallel the structure of the city. Before I continue with my description, I want to make sure that I get all of this correct, Socrates!

Socrates: Indeed! Carry on with your account.

Kimi: All right, I’m going to continue. So, now I am going to detail your account on the first part of the soul, the appetite. The clearest examples that you provide of appetites would be the desire to eat, or the desire to drink. In section 439d, you maintain that the appetitive part of the soul is irrational, and the rational calculative part is rational. Later, you maintain that the rational part of the soul should rule the soul in section 441e. Would that be correct?

Socrates: Yes. 

Kimi: So before I apply your logic about the soul to akrasia, I’m going to describe your third part of the soul: the spirit. In your example of Leotinus in section 439e - 440a, the disgust that he feels when he turns away from the corpses seems to be a part of his spirit. Then, you maintain that the spirit allies itself with the rational part of the soul, if the parts of the soul were engaged in civil war with each other. Would that be an accurate portrayal of what the spirit would mean? 

Socrates: Yes, I think so. 

Kimi: All right, so now I am going to extend your logic of the three parts of the soul to the possibility of akrasia, which seems to be logically consistent with your assertions in the Republic. 

Jumping back to section 441e, you argue that the rational part of the soul should, or ought to, rule over the soul. It is just like how the deliberative class, and the smallest class of citizens, should rule over a city. Now, Socrates, let me ask you a question. Do the words should or ought to mean the same thing as is? 

Socrates: No.

Kimi: So then, it seems to me that just because something should be a certain way does not mean that that is the way things actually are.

Socrates: Yes, that seems right.

Kimi: All right, Socrates. So in section 441e, don’t you say that the rational part should rule the entire soul, just as the wise men should rule the city? 

Socrates: Indeed. 

Kimi: Great, Socrates. Now I’m going to circle back to this idea of akrasia. Since you acknowledged that something should happen isn’t always reflective of reality, wouldn’t you agree that rationality does not always rule someone’s soul?

Socrates: Yes. 

Kimi: So isn’t it logically possible for a soul’s irrational appetite to overwhelm their rational part of the soul, making them act akratically? 

Socrates: Yes, though if a person were acting akratically, then they would definitely not have a healthy soul. For an agent with a healthy soul would have the virtue, moderation. 

Kimi: Ok, great. Then it seems under your logic, akrasia seems possible, right? 

Socrates: That seems so.

Jack: Hold on, Socrates. I’m going to back you up for a second, in that, I have an objection to your different parts of the soul. I think that there are only two parts of the soul. Would you be able to explain your reasoning behind your distinction between the spirit and rational calculation?

Socrates: Sure, that sounds good. I guess, before we get started, Jack, I’d like to ask you a question. Would you agree that Liebniz’s Law stands? If two objects do not share the same identity, wouldn’t they have different characteristics? 

Jack: I’m enjoying that we’re incorporating time travel into our dialogues, Socrates! But yes, I would agree that Liebniz’s Law stands.

Socrates: Conversely, if two objects are the same, wouldn’t they share all the same characteristics? 

Jack: Yes. 

Socrates: So, Jack, I have a question to ask you, and it refers to the example I provided in the Republic in section 441a. For your convenience, I’ll reiterate for you here. Small children display spirit right from birth, it seems. Yet they have not quite yet developed their rational calculation quite yet. If the spirit and the rational calculation were the same part of the soul, wouldn’t they be showing up at the same time?

Jack: Well, I have a completely different understanding of the situation. I think that a small child already has a natural rationality. For example, when a small child cries or is in distress, they know that they will be fed or will be cared for. 

Therefore, the emotions a small child displays, like anger, would be rational within themselves. The third part of the soul, the spirit, seems to be overcomplicating things. Since my explanation provides a simpler explanation for the entirety of the soul, we should adopt my perspective that there’s only two parts of the soul. 

Kimi: So Jack, what I’m hearing is that all emotions are rational. Because emotions are rational, they should fall under the same category as rational thoughts and not have their own category. Is that right?

Jack: Yes. 

Kimi: Hmm… Socrates, do you have any thoughts on how to rebut this?

Socrates: Emotions are rational in the sense that they are the only things that allow us to pursue long-term goals. Without my goal of enjoying sex, I would not take rational steps to keep my wife alive and by my side. But if I allowed myself to be distracted by short-term emotions with lower utilities attached, I would be irrational. For example, I could get too drunk to have sex and then miss out on the greater pleasure of sex because of the short-term pleasure of drunkenness. That would be a miscalculation.

Kimi: So, Socrates, if emotions are rational, how would you justify standing by your assertion that there are three parts of the soul? Now it seems even more apparent to me that there are only two parts of the soul. And now, emotions simply fall into rationality. 

Socrates: No, emotions don't fall into rationality. They just guide what we rationally pursue. My point is that although it's not irrational to set emotional long-term goals to maximize your happiness, emotions are not in themselves rational to feel. 

Kimi: Ah, now I think I understand your reasoning behind why the spirit is more closely linked to rational thought more clearly!