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Week Four: Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 7.1 - 7.4

For our last week, we decided to get a different perspective. In 7.1 - 7.4, Aristotle covers the topic of incontinence, though with a different take than Plato.

During 7.1 - 7.4 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle presents his view on akrasia. To Aristotle, one who knows does not always act with their most acute knowledge in mind. Additionally, he thinks that there are two types of knowledge: universal and particular. Universal knowledge is general and is about a kind, while particular knowledge is about individual things within a larger group.

 

An example of universal knowledge would be, “Everything that is sweet must be tasted,” for this knowledge pertains to the category of all things that are sweet. An example of particular knowledge would be, “This cookie is sweet,” for this knowledge is of a specific cookie.

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Aristotle compares individuals who act akratically to drunks and actors. At the time of committing akrasia, the akratic's knowledge is unable to restrain him from committing the worse action. Instead, his appetite leads his body to commit the worse action. He is overcome by pleasure that causes him to temporarily lose his long-term perspective, instead only caring about the immediate pleasure at stake.

Reading List

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics,

7.1 - 7.4

Edition: Cambridge University Press

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Secondary Source for the Week: "Intention and Weakness of Will" by Richard Holton

Citation: Holton, Richard. “Intention and Weakness of Will.” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 96, no. 5, 1999, pp. 241–262.

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Dialogue

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