Kimi: All right, Socrates. I just read sections 458e - 461b of the Gorgias, and think that I have a pretty good hold on Socratic rationalism. I am in agreement with Socratic rationalism, but I want to see if there are any inconsistencies in it, or make the argument stronger. Do you want me to lay out the different aspects of Socratic rationalism, and then go from there? 

Socrates: Yeah, that sounds good. 

Kimi: Okie dokie, so let’s begin. You present Socratic rationalism to Gorgias, which he agrees to, in order to show an inconsistency within his argument. Earlier in the dialogue, Gorgias asserted that if an orator used his oratorical skill unjustly, then we should not punish his teacher of rhetoric. Yet Gorgias agreed to Socratic rationalism, which is as follows:

P1: An agent will always do what he wants most. 

P2: An agent will want to do an action most if he thinks it the best decision. 

C1: The agent will do or choose to act on the decision that they think is the best. 

P1: The orator is learned in matters of justice and injustice. 

P2: The orator does just things. 

C2: The orator will not want to commit injustice. 

You showed Gorgias a logical inconsistency within his argument. If the orator does not want to commit injustice, then how can an orator ever use his oratorical skill to commit injustice?

Socrates: Rightly so.

Kimi: Ok, Socrates. Now I’m going to question your Socratic rationalism, and I want to see if we can strengthen it. You maintain that all desire is for the good since an agent will always do what they think best. Would that be right, Socrates?

Socrates: Yes, I would say so.

Kimi: Just to clarify, Socrates, an agent is never able to commit evil if they have full knowledge of what they are doing. Would that be correct, Socrates?

Socrates: Yes. 

Kimi: All right, Socrates. If I pose another hypothetical, would you be able to explain to me what’s happening, using Socratic rationalism?

Socrates: Of course.

Kimi: All right, so. In this hypothetical, X is upset at Y, and is thinking about Y. X and Y are really close family friends, so X knows the impact of Y’s death would have on Y’s family. Long term, X thinks that the best thing to do in this situation is not to kill his friend. But X would derive great pleasure from killing his friend; what he wants most is to see his friend dead. How would you explain this situation, Socrates?

Socrates: Well before I respond, I just want to straighten some things out. Are you trying to isolate my second premise?

Kimi: Rightly so. I agree with your first premise, but I am uncertain about your second premise. I don’t think that an agent will always want to make the best decision.

Socrates: Ok, then. Let me try to explain this situation using Socratic rationalism. I concede that what X wants most is to see Y dead, even though he acknowledges the grief, or damage, that killing Y would have on Y’s family and friends. 

But this situation seems fairly simple to me, and it’s not a flaw within Socratic rationalism. The problem lies with X. If X knows the consequences of killing Y and still desires to kill Y the most, then X has not learned how to gauge what is good for him in the long term versus what is good for him in the short term, which I covered in the Protagoras. 

Kimi: That makes sense. But Socrates, I have one more question for you. 

Socrates: Hit me.

Kimi: Ok Socrates, what about serial killers?

Socrates: What about them?

Kimi: Well, your perspective doesn’t necessarily seem reflective of reality all the time. There are some serial killers who are sadists and are fully aware of the pain that they are inflicting upon their victims and their families. Yet they still decide to proceed with killing people with that knowledge. If your thesis that all desire is for the good, then I think that it should even cover the most extremes of situations. 

Socrates: Desire is for the individual, not communal, good. If the serial killer can get away with his crime, it is perfectly rational - and good - for him to kill victims in order to gain pleasure. That would outweigh his sense of guilt. What makes serial killing wrong is not deriving pleasure from murder, but the fact that it is illegal. Only the law provides the prospective serial killer a rational reason to avoid his crime.

Kimi: So is there any rational or moral reason not to kill someone? It’s purely a matter of the law? 

Socrates: Morality comes from the law, not the other way around. On the individual level, there is only rationality, which is to pursue the path of maximizing what is good for one in the long term. But when we live in communities, those communities create laws. Those laws give us a rational reason to avoid crime so as to avoid punishment. So in a society with laws - or even the threat of an individual exacting reprisal on you - we have an incentive to avoid hurting others, at least in prohibited ways.

Kimi: But Socrates, I have a problem with that. If morality comes from the law, wouldn’t that mean that morality changes with the will of politicians? For example, during the Reign of Terror in eighteenth-century France, would it be morally right for the French government to have executed 17,000 people?  

Socrates: In that situation, the only judge of moral rectitude would be the people of France. And at that time, they believed it to be morally right. Laws may be silly or illogical, but morality is the fiction they produce. As philosophers, we must ignore that fiction and instead look to what is rational. Since it was irrational to create such a destructive bloodbath and actually undermine the Revolution by doing so, we could tell the politicians to stop the executions. But that is philosophical wisdom, not a moral judgment.

Kimi: Hold on, Socrates. My head is spinning. Earlier, you stated that morality comes from the law. But now, you seemed to have pivoted, saying that the only judges during the Reign of Terror were the people of France.

I think that I can explain your pivot. Does morality come from the laws when the lawmakers are being virtuous? And when the lawmakers are not virtuous, would it be up to the people to determine morality? That seems like a system that requires a lot of pivoting.  

Socrates: You are completely missing the point. I only said "the people" because, for a brief time during the Revolution, they made the law and were, therefore, the lawmakers. Morality is a fiction that is not worth your time as a philosopher, for it is just a fiction created by the law to keep the masses in line. We as philosophers have no need for it. The wise decision is to do what is rational. And what is rational is to maximize good for oneself. That's why I had a kid at 70 and allowed myself to be executed shortly thereafter. Why care about raising a child if I could just have sex and then leave?

Kimi: That makes sense. I think I need some coffee now.