Kimi: Ok, this is the beginning of the project. Jack, I have a question for you. Does akrasia, or weakness of will, even exist in the first place? Can a person intentionally refuse to act in their best interest, with a more pleasant alternative available to them (aka akrasia)? 

I think that denying the existence of akrasia is to say that everyone is a bad person. Everyone is going to make mistakes and still be good people; I think we should allow for that. 

Jack: I’m going to address your statement first and then answer your question. You say that if I deny the existence of akrasia, then I am saying that everyone is a bad person. Everyone is flawed. Is this a bad thing? I don’t see it. If anything, I think the opposite is true: any position that doesn’t hold that everybody is flawed is incorrect. 

Kimi: I acknowledge that everyone is flawed. However, without the existence of akrasia, everyone is a bad person. If virtue was a sea and people were trying to swim or become virtuous, then we would all be below the surface of the water. Nobody would be above it. 

Jack: Then, perhaps we should lower the water level.

Kimi: How would we do that? 

Jack: Lower the standards of what constitutes a good person. The other option is to teach people to swim.

Kimi: Well, you bring up an interesting point by bringing up trying to teach people how to swim. Can virtue in itself be taught?

Jack: One’s character is informed by their interactions with others and by the consequences of existing behaviors and attitudes. People can develop certain patterns of behavior and even of thought. Virtue can be taught as one develops their character.

Kimi: Hmm, ok. I’ll accept that answer simply because discussing whether or not virtue can be taught is opening a whole can of worms. 

Jack: Let me now answer your previous question: Does akrasia exist? I don’t think that it does. Every decision that people make is rational, even if it is not in their best interest.

Kimi: How can that be?

Jack: Let’s take, for instance, me deciding whether or not I should eat a Collins chocolate chip cookie. I know that this cookie is bad for me in the long term. If I eat too many cookies, I might get Type Two diabetes or suffer from other health related issues in the long run. In the short term, the cookie tastes good for me. 

Therefore, if I decide to eat the cookie, it is not due to a weakness of will. Rather, the short term pleasure that I get from eating the cookie in the short term has outweighed my considerations for my health in the long term. 

Kimi: Ok, I understand your argument. Your denial of akrasia is grounded in socratic rationalism, where you place different time values on when you receive pleasure. But I have a question for you. 

If everyone acts rationally all the time and akrasia does not exist, then how can regret exist? I know that when I experience regret, it’s usually because I knowingly acted against my best interests in that moment, i.e. akrasia.

Jack: People always act rationally in the moment, but when one looks back at an event given the benefit of hindsight, they may wish that they had done something different. This feeling is guilt or regret. Yet, people often forget that they would not have the benefit of hindsight had they not made the decision that they made in the first place. It takes mistakes in order for one to learn from them.

Kimi: So when people do something that they regret, was their original decision rational? Are people always acting rationally, or are there any exceptions to this rule? 

Jack: People are often short-sighted, so perhaps they shouldn’t prioritize their short term interests, but there is nothing illogical about doing so. Do you think that somebody can experience regret without acting from akrasia?

Kimi: I think so. But I can also think of examples where somebody acted from akrasia and experienced regret afterward. This happens every time I go shopping. I run across a sparkly top and I think that I don’t need it. But it’s really cute, and in an impulsive decision I run to the cashier and buy it. It’s only when I’m walking out of the shop that I realize that I didn’t need the top in the first place. I guess what I’m saying is that someone can experience regret when they act on their weakness of will, and when they are not acting on their weakness of will. 

Jack: Before we begin reading, let me ask you a final question. There are two views about the nature of goodness: one is that something is good for me because it benefits me, even if I don’t desire it, while the other is that something is good for me because I desire it, even if it doesn't benefit me. I subscribe to the latter view, but it seems that you subscribe to the former; is that correct?

Kimi: Yeah, that’s correct. For example, I don’t think that giving food to those experiencing homelessness is good because I gain happiness from the service. Giving food to those experiencing homelessness is a good action, independent of how much happiness I gain from the action.

Jack, it seems like we have two different ideas of what makes something good.