Kimi: All right, Jack. Just between you and me, I want to straighten out our understanding of the different types of the soul that Socrates describes in the Republic, Book IV. Do you think that the parts of the soul are faculties? Does appetite correspond to desire, reason to rational calculation, and spirit to emotion? Or do all the parts of the soul combine all three?

I think that all parts of the soul, regardless of how many we actually are counting (two or three), have a combination of desire, reason, and emotion within them. 

Jack: I would agree with you. It seems that all parts of the soul are capable of having reason, desires and emotions. 

Kimi: Yeah, it seems to me that appetite does not just directly correspond to desire. And the same goes for reason; it doesn’t seem like it’s strictly deliberation or thought. 

Ok, great! We’ve agreed that the parts of the soul combine all three characteristics: desire, reason, and emotion. 

So, Jack, let me ask. Within each part of the soul, how do you think all the characteristics are split up, and how would they interact with each other? 

Jack: No, no, no. I think that’s the wrong type of question to ask. If you ask that question, then we’ll be going down a rabbit hole that I think isn’t necessarily productive. 

Kimi: Yeah, I can see that, especially because I think we’ll be encroaching upon confusing territory. Our best attempts would be guesses, at the very most. 

Jack: All right, so let’s ditch that question for now. Kimi, I think we left our claim unsubstantiated. Now, I hope that we’re able to substantiate the claim we made via intuition through questioning. Is that ok?

Kimi: Yup! I definitely think so. 

Jack: Great. So, let’s focus on one part of the soul right now, in order to make things more straightforward for us: appetite. In section 438a, Socrates clearly states that an appetite is broad. For example, if I am thirsty, then I have an appetite for a drink. Kimi, how do you think we are able to have an appetite for something of a certain sort? 

Kimi: Well, I would think that having an appetite for particulars would require knowledge.

Jack: So, do you think that having an appetite for particulars would also require reason? 

Kimi: Yes. It seems that even though reason is a separate part of the soul, reasoning seems to exist within appetites, particularly within appetites for particulars. 

Jack: Why?

Kimi: Well, ok, let me try to wrap my head around this. Just to reiterate, I think that in order to have particular appetites, I must have had previous knowledge of the particular appetite within the first place. For example, I do not have a particular appetite to eat a Wendy’s Frosty’s at all because I’ve never had a Frosty. 

But I have had McDonald’s McFlurries. 

Jack: Wait, what does this have to do with anything?

Kimi: Hold on, I’m getting there! I think that when I have a particular appetite to eat, I want to eat the things that I've developed a taste for previously. And I must reason which foods I would prefer to eat. 

Jack: Wait wait wait. If your decision is about previous knowledge, then is it impossible to desire food you've never had? Most Americans have never eaten whale, but I would guess that a substantial minority of them are very interested in tasting it if they travel to Japan.

Kimi: Well, ok, wait. I’m going to answer your question, and then I kind of want to get back on track for a second, because I’m now questioning my original answer.

In response to your question, I think that the example that you brought up does still nevertheless pertain to previous knowledge.

Jack: Why?

Kimi: Well, an American tourist might have seen whale meat being eaten on television prior to visiting Japan. Or, since one is not allowed to eat whales within America but is allowed to in Japan, American tourists might be attracted to that "forbidden fruit" as well.

Jack: So your point is not so much that particular appetites require knowledge as it is that they require awareness. And one must reason through all the things of which one is aware in order to decide what to pursue as the primary appetite at that moment.

Kimi: Yes! That’s exactly what my point was for the McFlurries example. But now, that is making me question my initial intuitions and response to Prof. O’s question. I think that I’ve arrived at a different position. Because now, it seems apparent to me that particular appetites require previous awareness. However, previous awareness does not necessarily mean the same thing as reason, or rational calculation. If rational calculation and previous awareness are not the same thing, then it seems like reason and appetites are different faculties within themselves. 

Socrates: Did someone say GADFLY????

Jack: No. No one said that. But welcome back, Socrates.

Socrates: Thanks! Yes, reason and appetites are different faculties within themselves. And that's why they're separate parts of the soul.

Kimi: Huh, ok.

Jack: How about the conception of the soul that I defended?

Kimi: What about it?

Jack: This is the account that Hobbes and Hume - and others, but those two most famously - defended.

Kimi: I kinda figured that Hume defended it when he randomly showed up.

Jack: Do you find it persuasive?

Kimi: The idea that the soul is just desire - all desire, regardless of its nature - and reason, which is simply how one goes about achieving their desires?

Jack: Yes.

Kimi: I’m not sure. I’m not sure if we actually disagree. I mean, isn’t this just a question of how we categorize stuff?

Jack: I don’t believe in an immaterial soul, so yes - you’re exactly right.

Kimi: Then what’s the point?

Jack: Yeah, a lot of disagreement is just semantical and not actually a disagreement on substance.

Kimi: This seems like a good stopping point.

Jack: Indeed. Till next time.

Kimi: Good morrow.