Contemplating Plato's Akrasia
Gorgias: Revisiting Hedonism
Jack: Is a thing admirable because of the pleasure that it provides?
Socrates: Yes.
Jack: Then, something that is the opposite of admiral – something that is shameful – would be shameful because of the suffering that it causes?
Socrates: Necessarily so.
Jack: So shame is to be avoided because of the suffering it causes?
Socrates: Yes.
Jack: Suppose that it were possible for shame to occur without suffering. Would it still be bad?
Socrates: I see no reason why it would be.
Jack: So shame is bad not for its own sake, but insofar as it causes suffering?
Socrates: Yes.
Jack: Can this be said of other bad things as well?
Socrates: What do you mean?
Jack: Are bad things bad in themselves or because they induce suffering?
Socrates: The latter, of course.
Jack: And this is true of all things that are bad?
Socrates: It must be.
Jack: So then is acting unjustly bad for its own sake or bad because it causes suffering?
Socrates: Because it causes suffering.
Jack: Then if there are multiple bad things, are they of a different nature because they are bad for different reasons, or are they of the same nature because they are both bad for the same reason – that reason being that they cause suffering?
Socrates: They are of the same nature.
Jack: If one is forced to choose between two bad things, which should they choose?
Socrates: Whichever thing is less bad than the other.
Jack: And the reason why this thing is less bad is that it causes less suffering?
Socrates: Yes.
Jack: If a person is tortured, who suffers more? The person being tortured or a passerby who watches the torture take place while sympathizing with the person being tortured?
Socrates: The one being tortured.
Jack: So is someone who suffers indirectly – only through the suffering of another – better off than the person who suffers directly?
Socrates: Yes.
Jack: You already said earlier that unjust acts are not bad in themselves but because they cause suffering. Then, would the suffering of one who acts unjustly be indirect?
Socrates: I grant it.
Jack: Can one suffer in any way other than directly or indirectly?
Socrates: I don’t see how one could.
Jack: So is the suffering of another, of which I am completely unaware, bad for me?
Socrates: It can’t be, for you don’t suffer either directly or indirectly.
Jack: So then suffering must affect me for it to be bad for me?
Socrates: Yes.
Jack: Should I then, prefer, suffering myself or having another person suffer equally?
Socrates: The other.
Jack: Then, if I cause another to suffer, wouldn’t it not be as bad for me, who suffers indirectly, as it is for the other, who suffers directly?
Socrates: I concede that it appears to be the case.
Jack: So then is a man who suffers worse off than one who causes suffering?
Socrates: I see no way around it.