Kimi: Right, so in the Protagoras, Socrates maintains the hedonistic thesis, where pleasure is good and pain is bad. Beginning in section 355b, he then uses the hedonistic thesis to point out an absurdity that akrasia presents. Socrates, do you want to state your stance?

Socrates: Hello Kimi, Jack. It’s a shame that this pandemic is going on so that we can’t grab lunch, as usual. Weakness of will, as it stands, is incompatible with the hedonistic thesis. And in the Protagoras, I used the hedonistic thesis for my reasoning and demonstrated akrasia’s absurdity. I think that you have to give up one or the other. Let me ask you two: do you think that pain is the only bad and pleasure is the only good?

Kimi: For the sake of trying to follow your logic, we’ll grant your premise for now. Pleasure is the only good and pain is the only bad.

Socrates: Alright, moving on then. So pleasure is identical to the good, and pain is identical to the bad. But that seems to be at odds with the common account of akrasia. Jack, what’s the common account for akrasia?

Jack: Well, it’s when an agent knows that an option will make him worse off, or produce more pain for him, and has a more preferable option available to him, nevertheless chooses the worse option. According to the common account of akrasia, the agent chooses to do this because he is overwhelmed by pleasure. 

Socrates: Ok, great. Now I’m going to walk through my substitution, which proves akrasia’s absurdity within itself. First, let’s condense the amount of names that we’re using; let’s first use good and bad. Ok so, akrasia says, if a man knows the bad to be bad and does it, it is because he is overwhelmed by pleasure. Let’s replace that. Now we have: if a man knows the bad to be bad does it, it is because he is overwhelmed by good. 

Kimi: But that’s absurd, given that an agent wants to maximize his pleasure? 

Socrates: Well that’s exactly the absurdity. Akrasia seems to demand that something bad can come out of pleasure, i.e. goodness. And that’s just a weird conclusion.

 

Jack and Kimi (at the same time): Ok, and now we have some questions for you, Socrates.

Socrates: Ask away.

Jack: Socrates, I must say that you present some compelling arguments. Does one have any reason to care about the pleasure of anyone other than himself?

Kimi: Yeah! Why shouldn’t I go out and murder other people?

Socrates: One ought to be virtuous for their own sake. But one who is virtuous does care about others because compassion is a virtue.

Jack: Why is compassion a virtue?

Socrates: One who is compassionate does not care about all others, for one who cares about all others regardless of circumstance is simply foolish. One who is wise about the character of others knows which of those others they care about. Just as wisdom is a virtue, so is compassion.

Jack: That makes sense.

Kimi: Socrates, I have a question for you. You maintain that pleasure is the only good. Now tell me, do all pleasures have an equal amount of goodness?

Socrates: No; the amount of goodness a pleasure actually has is equal to how much pleasure it produces. 

Kimi: Ok, great. So just to clarify your position: it’s strictly about the quantity of pleasure that something produces that determines how good it actually is?

Socrates: Correct.

Kimi: Alright Socrates. So if it’s about the quantity of goodness, should I hook myself up to morphine or should I spend my time reading philosophy?  I’ll experience the most amount of pleasure if I hook myself up to morphine…

Jack (interrupting): If hooking yourself up to the morphine will produce the maximum amount of pleasure, then should you do it?

Socrates: Not all pleasure is of the same degree. The drunkard’s bliss is a less substantial pleasure than the philosopher’s fulfillment.

Jack: What differentiates them?

Socrates: The strength of the pleasure. The drunkard’s bliss is hollow like eating a croissant. The more substantive pleasure is eating a fine steak that leaves one full in the stomach for a long time.

Kimi: Damn, it must have good lamination! Sorry, I really like croissants. 

Jack: And Socrates, I’m a vegetarian.

Socrates: Oh, sorry, I didn’t know that.

Jack: All good, just letting you know for next time.

Kimi: Ok! Getting back on track! So, Socrates, you say that there are different kinds of pleasures, like comparing the croissant and the steak to each other. Socrates, let me ask you this. Are all kinds of pleasures purely good? I guess what I’m saying is: can I always substitute the word “good” for all kinds of pleasure, or is it just some types of pleasure?

Socrates: One ought to pursue the greatest pleasure. Any hollow or fleeting pleasure that leaves one content stops one from pursuing greater pleasures. While such a pleasure would still be good, it does stop one from pursuing a greater good.

Kimi: So having sex is always good?

Socrates: Not necessarily, for having sex insofar as it prevents one from obtaining greater pleasures is bad. For example, suppose that one chooses to miss a symposium in favor of having sex. In that case, the pleasure derived from sex would be good, but the participation in sex itself is not good, for it interfered with one’s ability to pursue a greater pleasure.

Kimi: That’s a damn good answer. So as I’m taking it, there are pleasures that produce some good, and others that produce greater amounts of good, am I getting that correct?

Socrates: Yeah, pretty much.

Kimi: So there's no possibility for pleasure to be bad?

Socrates: Pleasure is synonymous with goodness. There cannot be such a thing as bad goodness, for it is oxymoronic, so there cannot be such a thing as bad pleasure.

Kimi: Screw off, Socrates. I disagree with that premise. 

Jack: Woah, Kimi, that’s a little harsh.

Kimi: Ahaha now I’m chuckling nervously. Socrates, please don’t take it personally, I tell everyone to screw off at least once. It just means that I love them. And I love you, Socrates!

How about this bloody example. If I derive pleasure from murdering people, is my pleasure good?

Socrates: Yes. The pleasure of murdering within itself is good because it makes you feel good. However, in the long run, the act of murdering might be irrational because you might get caught and punished.

Jack: Further, someone with a virtuous character would not derive pleasure from needlessly killing another, for their wisdom of the character of others would prevent them from taking pleasure in harming another good man.

Kimi: Could somebody still derive pleasure from killing someone of bad character?

Jack: I suppose that they could.

Socrates: The pleasure would not stem directly from the act of killing, for there is nothing enjoyable about the mere act of killing. In fact, a virtuous man cares about others, so the act of killing itself he would find painful. The source of this pleasure would be in knowing that one makes the world better by killing such a person.

Kimi: Alright, I’m fine with that. 

Jack: Kimi, do you think that killing somebody is ever justified? If not, is it ever at least acceptable?

Kimi: Jack, to answer your question, I think that there are instances where killing somebody is justified. For example, if a person is terminally ill and wishes to die rather than suffer any more, I think that it is justified for a doctor-assisted death. I don’t think that the doctor is doing anything wrong, nor is the patient.

Socrates: Alright, what about executing war criminals? 

Kimi: Yes, I’m ok with that. War criminals commit egregious crimes against humanity. For example, the world would have been better off without Hitler. 

Socrates: So, for example, if I killed Hitler, you would be ok with that?

Kimi: Yes.

Socrates: Why?

Kimi: Because Hitler was dead. He no longer has the ability to commit war crimes,  perpetrate genocide, and wage world war. 

Socrates: So what I’m hearing is, you would derive pleasure from Hitler’s death, knowing that the world became a better place because he was dead?

Kimi: Yes… Damnit Socrates! Why are you so good at questioning!?!

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